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In light of the current economic crisis, we estimate hazard models of divorce to determine how state
and national unemployment rates affect the likelihood of divorce.  With 89,340 observations over
the 1978-2006 period for 7633 couples from the 1979 NLSY, we find mixed evidence on whether
increases in the unemployment rate lead to overall increases in the likelihood of divorce, which would
suggest countercyclical divorce probabilities.  However, further analysis reveals that the weak evidence
is due to the weak economy increasing the risk of divorce only for couples in years 6 to 10 of marriage.
For couples in years 1 to 5 and couples married longer than 10 years, there is no evidence of a pattern
between the strength of the economy and divorce probabilities.  The estimates are generally stronger
in magnitude when using national instead of state unemployment rates.
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Roughly half of all marriages end in divorce.  This is particularly disturbing when considering 
the negative effects family disruptions have on children’s academic, behavioral, psycho-social 
adjustment and the large costs to society (e.g., Amato and Keith 1991; Scafidi 1998; Amato 
2001). Historically, weak economic periods have been thought to increase the likelihood of 
families divorcing, as financial strains can cause considerable marital tension.  Currently, the 
U.S. is going through what many believe is the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression.  
Unemployment, at over 9%, is the highest it has been since 1982, although alternative measures 
of unemployment that take into account those who have given up searching for a job and those 
who have less employment than they want suggest that this understates the severity of the 
problem. 
Evidence on higher divorce rates during weak economic periods comes from the results 
of widely-cited studies showing that husband’s unemployment increases the probability that a 
couple divorces (e.g., Hoffman and Duncan 1995).  But, some anecdotal evidence from the 
current economic crisis suggests that couples are staying together because they cannot afford to 
divorce (Johnson, 2008).   
Theoretically, either effect is possible.  Given the high cost of divorce (from court costs 
and needing to fund separate residences), a weak economy could reduce the number of divorces.  
At the same time, a weak economy could increase divorces because of financial strain 
(mentioned above) and perhaps because expectations about future economic prospects could 
change, which could reduce the value of the marriage for some. 
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Whereas several studies have examined how individual economic circumstances affect 
the probability of divorce (e.g., Hoffman and Duncan 1995; Weiss and Willis 1997; Schoen, 
Astone et al. 2002; White and Rogers 2000 in a review of the prior literature), only a few studies 
have examined how macroeconomic factors affect the probability of divorce (South 1985; 
Ruggles 1997; Ono 1999).  These studies were mostly based on fairly old data.  In addition, the 
studies either used national economic data or used state economic data without any controls for 
state characteristics that might affect divorce rates independent from the economy’s effect.  
Thus, period effects (when using national data) or spurious correlation of state economic factors 
with factors at the state level (such as different state divorce laws) could have affected the 
results.  Furthermore, the studies did not account for potential differential effects of the economy 
on the likelihood of divorce at different stages of marriage.  It is possible that a weak economy 
could hurt young marriages but have much less effect on long-established marriages, which often 
have survived previous recessions and other challenging times. 
In this paper, we examine how the economy affects the risk of divorce with more recent 
data and a new approach.  Using the framework of survival analysis that allows the underlying 
hazard of divorce to differ for each state, we estimate how changes in the economy (proxied by 
monthly state or national unemployment rates) affect the probability of a marriage ending in 
divorce.  In addition, we examine differences in how changes in the economy affect the 
probability of divorce at various stages of marriage.   We use data from the 1979 National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY-79).  These data have detailed information on marital 
status changes along with their dates.   
We find that a weak economy (as proxied by a higher unemployment rate) has different 
effects on the likelihood of a divorce depending on the stage of marriage. Specifically, for 
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couples who are in their first 5 years of marriage or who have been married more than 10 years, 
there is no significant relationship between the strength of the economy and their odds of 
divorce.  However, couples in years 6 to 10 of marriage clearly have countercyclical divorce 
rates under various model specifications and sensitivity analyses—i.e., higher divorce rates when 
the economy is weaker.  These results suggest that the current economic crisis is leading to more 
divorces for couples married 6 to 10 years. 
 
PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
Studies on factors of divorce 
The typical framework for examining how certain factors affect the probability of a couple 
divorcing is a hazard model.  This model is able to capture duration dependence (that the 
stability of a marriage may increase as the duration increases) and allows factors to be time-
varying.  That is, the economic environment or the number of children will change over time, 
and the hazard model allows the variables to vary for a couple over time. 
The literature on the causes of divorces have identified several factors.  Some of the 
characteristics associated with higher divorce rates are: being younger at the time of marriage, 
having less education, and being Black (e.g., Hiedemann et al., 1998; Steele et al., 2005; 
Hoffman and Duncan, 1995; Lillard and Waite, 1993).   
Another important factor is the presence of children.  Most of the early studies generally 
found that pre-school children tend to reduce the risk of divorce, but older children increase the 
risk—see a review of these studies by Lillard and Waite (1993) and more recent evidence by 
Hoffman and Duncan 1995; Weiss and Willis 1997; Steele, Kallis et al. 2005).  These studies 
may have suffered from endogeneity in that couples who are in more stable marriages are more 
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likely to have children.  A few studies did address the issue of endogeneity of children.  
However, the results of these studies were mixed (see Lillard and Waite 1993; Vuri 2003; Svarer 
and Verner 2008).  Part of the reason for the mixed results may be some of the identifying 
assumptions, such as using the assumption of conditional independence.   
 
Studies on how economic outcomes affect marital stability 
There have been several studies on how individual economic factors affect the probability of a 
couple divorcing.  The typical theory is that higher earnings for husbands tend to reduce any 
financial strain in the family and stabilize marriages (so, husband’s unemployment could lead to 
divorce).  However, South (1985) argued that higher family income makes divorces more 
affordable.  Higher wives’ earnings can have the same effects.  In addition, Becker (1973, 1974) 
argued that higher-earning wives reduce the gains from specialization within the marriage (from 
the historically traditional roles of the husband working and the wife engaged in household 
production).   
Empirically, estimating the effects of individual economic outcomes is difficult, as the 
individual economic outcomes of husbands and wives may not be exogenous to marital stability.  
The most likely such phenomenon is that a wife who is unhappy in the marriage may change her 
investments away from the household (including having kids) and towards labor market 
activities.  That is, perhaps in anticipation of potentially getting divorced, the wife may start 
working towards personal financial viability.  Indeed, Schoen, Rogers et al. (2006) found that 
unhappily married women are more likely to shift to full-time work than happily married 
women.  Likewise, Rogers (1999) found that marital instability precedes higher earnings for 
wives more than vice versa.  For husbands, being unhappily married could reduce the incentive 
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to work hard to provide for the family.  In addition, it is possible that general instability in a 
marriage and the effort needed to improve marriage stability will prevent either spouse from 
making investments in their human capital that could lead to the greater economic prospects in 
the future.   
Most studies did not address the endogeneity of individual economic outcomes and just 
assumed that the individual economic outcomes were exogenous.  These studies have found 
consistent evidence that higher  husband’s earnings is associated with greater marital stability 
(e.g., Hoffman and Duncan 1995; Jalovaara 2003).  However, the results have been mixed for 
wives.  Some studies found that higher wife’s earnings is associated with a lower probability of 
divorce (e.g., Hoffman and Duncan 1995, Sayer and Bianchi 2000, Schoen, Rogers et al. 2006), 
but others studies found that higher wife’s earnings are associated with a greater probability of 
divorce (e.g., Suhomlinova and O'Rand 1998; Jalovaara 2003).  And, Schoen, Astone et al. 
(2002) found that the wife’s labor force participation is associated with a higher probability of 
divorce only among those with unhappy marriages, which is consistent with the endogeneity 
story from above.   
A few studies attempted to address the potential endogeneity associated with economic 
outcomes for both spouses and marital stability, but there has not been any convincing study 
addressing this problem.  Weiss and Willis (1997) used predicted rather than actual earnings of 
the husband and wife.  However, the predicted earnings were based on changes over time in 
current labor market status, education, and fertility status.  These changes, one could easily 
argue, are generally expected outcomes at the time of marriage, making them endogenous to the 
marital formation decision.  Ressler and Waters (2000) estimated a simultaneous equations 
model for wife’s earnings and divorce.  However, they relied on the assumption that fertility 
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affects female earnings, but not the probability of divorce.  Whereas Weiss and Willis (1997) 
found that higher wife’s earnings stabilizes marriages, Ressler and Waters (2000) found the 
opposite result. 
An alternative approach to examining how economic factors affect divorce would be to 
look at how divorces respond to changes in macroeconomic conditions.  Using macro-level 
rather than individual-level economic variables avoids the endogeneity problem.  There have 
only been three studies that have examined the role of the macroeconomy on divorces.  South  
(1985) estimated a time-series model for the divorce rate for the 1948-79 period.  In several 
specifications, he generally found that a higher national unemployment rate and lower Gross 
National Product growth are associated with higher divorce rates.  This suggested 
countercyclical divorce rates.  Ruggles (1999) estimated separate cross-sectional models and a 
pooled model from 11 Census’ from 1880 to 1990, using local economic factors, and found that 
higher female labor force participation and greater growth in nonfarm employment were 
associated with higher divorce rates.  This suggested procyclical divorce rates.  And, Ono (1999) 
used Current Population Survey data from 1980, 1985, and 1990 to measure marriage histories 
over the 1950-87 period.  He examined the effects of national median husbands’ and wives’ 
incomes and found that both contribute positively to the probability of separation, again 
suggesting procyclical divorce rates.  These latter two studies stand in contrast to the results from 
most individual-level studies that found that higher husband’s earnings reduce the chance of 
divorce.   
One potential shortcoming of South (1985) is that there were no cohort controls or period 
controls other than the Korean and Vietnam wars, so that there could have been incidental 
correlation between the unemployment rate and any cohort or period effect.  A potential 
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shortcoming of Ruggles (1999) and Ono (1999) is that they did not use any geographical 
controls.  Thus, it is possible that unobserved heterogeneity could have affected the results.  That 
is, it may be that areas with higher income had higher divorce rates due to factors spuriously 
correlated with income (such as low religiosity).  Lastly, none of the studies (either the 
individual-level or the macro-level) investigated whether the effect of economy might be 
different for couples at different stages of the marriage. 
In this study, we address these shortcomings from the previous studies by controlling for 
cohort and period effects and accounting for different underlying hazards of divorce across 
states.  We analyze data that are, on average, more recent (1979 to 2006).  Furthermore, the 
primary contribution of the current study is that it examines how the strength of the economy 
affects divorce rates at different stages of marriage. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
We will use a simple dynamic model of marital continuation/dissolution that follows the models 
used by Becker, Landes et al. (1977) and Weiss and Willis (1997).  The model can incorporate 
new information, so that it can allow changing economic conditions to affect the benefits and 
costs of marriage.  Following these authors, we ignore the role of the initial marital formation. 
In this model, marriage is a partnership in which the couple consumes goods together and 
makes marital-specific investments (such as children and property) that can, in theory, increase 
the benefits of marriage.  The expected gains from marriage depend on the traits of the two 
partners, such as temperament and earnings capacity.  But, those traits can change over time, as 
well as the value of the alternative to marriage.  So, each partner makes continuous decisions on 
whether to continue with the marriage or end it.   
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We can use a household production function to characterize the net gains from marriage.  
The net gains incorporate the opportunity costs of staying married, which includes the value of 
the benefits of being single and the costs of divorce.  The production function depends on the 
characteristics of the two partners (xh,t and xw,t for the husband and wife in time period t), the 
level of marital-specific capital (kt, representing, for example, children and property), and the 
unobserved quality of the match (t).  All of these factors can change over time, as indicated by 
the t subscript.  The production function for the net gains, thus, is the following: 
 
gt = G(xh,t, xw,t, kt, t). 
 
Let us denote a vector of the four generic inputs into the production function:  
yt = (xh,t, xw,t, kt, t).  We will suppose that yt follows a stochastic difference equation: 
 
yt’ = Byt-1’ + t 
 
where B is a matrix of coefficients and t is a vector of unanticipated changes to the components 
of yt.  So, each value of the components of yt depends on the value from the previous period plus 
any unanticipated shock. 
Let Vt(yt) denote the net gains to continue the marriage in period t.  Using  as a discount 
factor less than one, the value function can be written as: 
 




A couple will stay married if Vt(yt) is greater than zero and divorce if Vt(yt) is less than zero.  
Using backward recursion to solve for Vt, this divorce-decision rule will depend on the values 
each period of the characteristics of each spouse (including earnings capacity), the marital-
specific investments (again, children and property as the prime examples), the match quality 
(which is unobserved), and any factors causing changes to these characteristics, investments, and 
quality.   
Operationally, as we described above, many of the individual characteristics of the 
husband and wife (such as earnings) and the investments are not exogenous, as the commitment 
to the marriage could dictate investments in children and property and, particularly, the wife’s 
earnings capacity.  However, the measure of the aggregate economy should be purely exogenous.   
One mechanism for how the economy would affect the probability of divorce would 
come through the economy’s effects on the husband’s and wife’s employment outcomes and 
earnings capacity. A stronger economy would increase the chances of employment for both, and 
with that, would likely be associated with higher earnings. Higher earnings among either the 
husband or wife could reduce the risk of divorce by reducing financial strain on the family, 
thereby reducing marital tension.  Furthermore, having higher earnings would allow the couple 
to make marital-specific investments, such as buying a home or going on vacations, which could 
increase the long-term benefits of marriage and, perhaps, discourage divorce (Becker, Landes et 
al. 1977).  Based on these mechanisms, a strengthening economy would reduce the probability of 
divorce.   
At the same time, other mechanisms could cause a strengthening economy to lead to a 
higher probability of divorce.  Divorces are costly, with most of those costs coming from court 
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expenses and having to support two residences instead of one.  A stronger economy would then 
allow a married couple to more easily absorb these costs of divorces.   
The increased earning power of the wife (from a stronger economy) would have the same 
effects as discussed above for its contribution to family income, but it could also more directly 
reduce the costs of divorce for a woman by making her economically viable on her own.  That is, 
she would be less reliant on her husband for economic support after the divorce. 
In summary, the strength of the economy could affect a married couple’s decision to 
continue or dissolve a marriage through several mechanisms as discussed above.  It is impossible 
to distinguish between all the mechanisms due to the endogeneity of individual factors.  Our goal 
is to estimate the total effect of the economy, proxied by the monthly state or national 
unemployment rate, on the marriage survival while controlling for the factors that are deemed 




The data for this analysis come from the NLSY-79, which started with 12,686 individuals who 
were between 14 and 22 years old at the time of the first interview in 1979.  The subsequent 
interviews were annual through 1994, at which point they became biennial.  We use data through 
the 2006 round. The survey included supplemental samples of military (which we exclude due to 
having a small sample and not having enough years of observation), minorities (Blacks and 
Hispanics), and low-income non-minority youth.  We apply sample weights to produce a 
nationally representative sample.   
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The NLSY-79 has very detailed information on the actual year/month of all marriages 
and divorces.  This allows us to estimate the survival models based on the timing of the divorce 
relative to anniversaries.  Furthermore, we can take advantage of monthly unemployment rates 
timed to the dates of marriage for a couple and not have to rely just on annual unemployment 
rates.  The NLSY-79 also has detailed demographic and family factors, such as the couple’s 
educational status, state of residence, and the number and ages of children.  The state information 
can be used to match monthly state-level economic data.   
For the measures of the economy, we use two different types of unemployment rates 
obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ website (www.bls.gov/data).  In one set of models, 
we use monthly state unemployment rates.  In another set of models, we use monthly national 
unemployment rates.  The advantages of each are described below. 
 
Sample 
From the 12,686 NLSY-79 respondents, we first exclude 1280 respondents (10.1%) who were 
part of the military sub-sample, as they were dropped from the NLSY-79 after the 1984 survey 
round.  The sample then takes the 7972 respondents who had their first marriage between 1978 
(one year before the first interview) and 2005, which drops 30.0% of the remaining sample.  This 
allows information on husband and wife education and children to be included for the first year 
of marriage.  Marriages in the prior years would not have this information.  We exclude 
marriages occurring in 2006, as we would not observe the completion of the first year of 
marriage for these people, although we still use observations from 2006 on whether marriages 
ended in divorce.  We then exclude 197 couples (2.5%) who were married for less than one year, 
as they would not have a lagged unemployment rate during their marriage.  Finally, 142 couples 
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(1.8%) were dropped for not being in a state or the District of Columbia in any observed year of 
marriage.  Creating one observation for each year of marriage for each couple, our final sample 
is a panel of 89,340 observations for 7633 couples, with each observation for a given couple 
representing one year of marriage.  All models are weighted by the original 1979 sample weight. 
 
Empirical Models 
Following the standard literature on survival analysis, we analyze the hazard of divorce using a 
proportional hazard model.  The proportional hazard framework is the natural choice to examine 
marriage survival.  It is nonparametric, and thus, we do not have to assume a priori whether the 
marriage survival rate has a positive or negative dependence on time.  The advantage of the 
NLSY-79 data is that it records the actual month/year in which the marriage and divorce 
occurred (if the marriage ends during the study period).  This allows us to determine if the couple 
reaches each anniversary, which allows us to use the standard Cox proportional hazard model 
(proposed originally by Cox 1972) .    
In the proportional hazard framework, for each couple we define one-year intervals 
during which we can observe marital status.  A couple enters the model on the day of their 
marriage (denoted as t0).  We would denote their subsequent wedding anniversaries as t1, t2 and 
so on.  Couples who were married during the study period and stayed married at the end of the 
study period are censored at the end.   
In the econometric model, the probability that couple i got divorced given that they were 




(1)     
1 2 3 4 0
Prob(couple  got divorced by anniversary  | stayed married until anniversary )
= exp( ' ' ' ) ( )it it it it
i t t -1
UR X S Y t         
where  
0 (t )  = the baseline hazard rate for divorce for 0 to 12 months prior to anniversary t;   
URit = the 12-month average unemployment rate for the year leading up to anniversary 
t-1 (i.e., 13-24 months prior to anniversary t);  
Xit = a vector of individual and family characteristics as of anniversary t-1; 
Sit  = a vector of state indicators as of anniversary t-2; 
Yit = a vector of year-group indicators for anniversary t. 
 
In essence, the model examines whether the average unemployment rate in the 12 months 
preceding anniversary t-1 affects the probability of a divorce in the (t-1, t] period, given that the 
couple stayed married up to t-1.  See Figure A-1 in the Appendix for a timeline example of when 
we measure the outcome and the unemployment rate.  Note that we do not use the 
unemployment rate for 0-12 months prior to anniversary t because much of that would occur 
after the divorce—that is, on average, those divorcing would do so 6 months prior to the next 
anniversary, so unemployment rates for 0-12 months prior to the anniversary would partly reflect 
the economy after the divorce decision is reached. The state indicators, Sit, are based on the state 
the couple lived in as of t-2, which is the beginning of the 12-month period (in which the 
unemployment rate is measured) preceding the year of marriage leading to anniversary t.  The 
state indicators control for differences in underlying divorce hazards across states that may be 
incidentally correlated with the unemployment rates.  This will capture time-invariant differences 
in divorce rates across states due to state policies/culture unrelated to unemployment.  Hardly 
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any divorce policies (e.g., unilateral divorce laws) changed during our time of analysis, so state 
dummy variables should capture most of the state differences attributable to these policies.  The 
year-group indicators, Yit, capture differences in divorce rates for the period (more details 
below).  
There is an initial set of four models using various sets of one-year-lagged unemployment 
rates.  A second set of four models will repeat the first set, but also include two-year-lagged 
unemployment rates.  Model 1 uses the one-year-lagged unemployment rate for the state of 
residence of the couple, with the state of residence being that as of the interview prior to when 
the unemployment rate is measured (i.e., the year preceding the current year of marriage). The 
state unemployment variables differ across couples due to variation in marriage dates and state 
of residence—if two couples from the same state got married in the same year/month, they 
would have identical values for the unemployment rates.  
Model 2 uses the equivalent of a spline function, in which we have the one-year-lagged 
state unemployment rates for three groups based on the length of marriage: in years 1 to 5 of 
marriage, in years 6 to 10, and in years 11 or more.  We had broken down the later years (beyond 
10 years of marriage) in more detail, but there was little difference between the estimates for 
those groups and the sample gets smaller, so we just grouped them for greater precision.  Model 
2 allows for an examination of whether unemployment rate might have different effects on a 
couple’s divorce hazard depending on the stage of their marriage.  In this model, the likelihood 
of divorce for couples in the first 5 years of marriage are compared to other couples in the first 5 
years of marriage facing different state unemployment rates; and the same comparisons are made 
for the other two stages of marriage. 
Models 3 and 4 are the same as Models 1 and 2, but they use the national unemployment 
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rate instead of the state unemployment rate. The national unemployment rate just varies across 
couples based on the timing of the anniversaries. The national unemployment rate has 
advantages over the state unemployment rate in that it is less subject to measurement error and it 
represents the whole country, as people can always move to an area with better economic 
conditions.  The drawback to using the national unemployment rate is that there could be 
incidental correlation of the unemployment rate with cohort or period effects (from the time at 
marriage or the year of analysis), which could include national events such as campaigns to 
strengthen marriages or tax changes affecting marriage incentives. Controlling fully for the time 
periods would take away all variation in the national unemployment rate.  Instead, we address 
this by including the year-of-analysis and year-of-marriage indicator variables in three-year 
groups. 
Models 5 to 8 then repeat Models 1 to 4, while adding the equivalent two-year-lagged 
unemployment rates to the model.  This is meant to determine if further lags matter and even are 
more important than the one-year-lagged unemployment rate.  However, there could be a high 
correlation between the state one-year and two-year-lagged unemployment rates, which could 
cause multicollinearity, resulting in biased estimates and inflated standard errors. 
 
Other Explanatory variables 
In terms of demographic characteristics that might systematically affect divorce rates, some 
information is only available for the NLSY-79 respondent, whereas other information is 
available for both the respondent and his/her spouse.  The information only available for the 
respondent includes the respondent’s race (we use indicators for being Black and Hispanic), 
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religion, attendance at religious services, and the respondent’s percentile score for the Armed 
Forces Qualification Test (AFQT, a measure of aptitude).   
The information that is also available for the spouse includes age at the time of marriage 
and education.  For age at the time of marriage, we use indicators for 3-year age groups to 
improve the precision of the estimates.  For education, we use non-mutually-exclusive indicators 
for having a high school diploma and a bachelor’s degree.  For these variables that are available 
for the spouse, we create separate variables for the husband and wife so we can examine whether 
certain factors are more important for the husband or wife.  We also include a variable for 
whether the NLSY79 respondent is the husband or the wife.  The information on the spouse’s 
age, high school diploma status, and bachelor’s degree status were missing for about 7%, 8%, 
and 21% of the sample, respectively.  In such cases, we assign the following values for the 
spouse: an age where the husband is two years older than the wife (consistent with current 
statistics), having a high school diploma, not having a bachelor’s degree, and having an AFQT 
percentile score of 50 (the median).  Furthermore, we include indicator variables for having 
missing information on the age-at-marriage, high school diploma, and bachelor’s degree for both 
the husband and wife.   
As noted above, the model also includes indicators for 3-year groups for the year of 
marriage cohort and for the year of analysis (e.g., for the year of analysis, evaluating whether the 
couple survived the 8th year of marriage, the model controls for what 3-year group the 8th 
anniversary fell in).  It should be noted that the year-of-marriage variables, the year-of-analysis 
variables, and the age-at-marriage variables are highly correlated with each other.  Thus, the 
estimates on them (which we do not present) would be difficult to interpret, but they should 





Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the model, other than the 
missing-variable, year-of-marriage, year-of-analysis, age-at-marriage, and state indicator 
variables.  However, the raw age at marriage (which is used to create the indicator variables) is 
included in Table 1.  The average age at marriage was 25 for husbands and 23 for wives.   
Figure 1 shows the unadjusted survival probability of marriage.  By 10 years of marriage, 
over 25% of couples have divorced.  By 20 years, over 40% have divorced.  And by the end of 
our data at 29 years, the likelihood of being divorced is just over 50%.  Note that the percentage 
of couples in our analysis that divorce will be less than that figure because most are censored 
long before reaching 29 years of marriage.  The divorce rates vary by the stage of marriage.  In 
the first 5 years of marriage, the annual divorce rate is 3.8%, on average.  It slows to 2.9% for 
those in years 6 to 10 of marriage.  And, the divorce rate is 2.0%, on average, beyond 10 years of 
marriage. 
Table 2 shows the coefficient and hazard ratio estimates, along with the standard errors, 
for the first two models, using the state unemployment rates.  First, we will discuss the results 
other than the unemployment rates, all of which are stable across the models.  Having children 
under age 6 reduces the hazard of divorce by 75%, as does having children over 6 years old (p < 
0.01).  Relative to not having a high school diploma, having a diploma has hardly any effect on 
the hazard of divorce, but either spouse having a bachelor’s degree significantly reduces the 
hazard of divorce, more so for females (by 30%; p < 0.01) than for males (by 21%; p <  0.01).  
Relative to the NLSY respondent being non-Black and non-Hispanic, Black respondents have 
just about the same risk of divorce, while Hispanic respondents have about a 27% lower hazard 
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of divorce (p < 0.01).  A higher AFQT score of the NLSY respondent is not significantly 
associated with a different probability of divorce.  Relative to those without a religion, Catholics, 
Baptists, and other Christians have about the same divorce hazard.  Jewish people have about 
55% lower hazard of getting divorced (p < 0.05). And, those who reported having other religions 
do not have significantly different hazards of divorcing compared to the reference group.  The 
frequency of religious attendance has no significant effect on divorce probabilities.  For space 
considerations, we do not show the coefficient estimates for the missing-value-indicator 
variables and the year-of-marriage, year-of-analysis, age-at-marriage variables, and state.  As 
mentioned earlier, there is high multi-collinearity between many of these indicator variables, so 
their purpose is just to serve as control variables.  
Model 1 uses the one-year-lagged state unemployment rate as a measure of the economy.  
The hazard on that variable is statistically insignificant.  However, as seen in Model 2, the effect 
is not the same for all stages of marriage.  There is no effect for couples in the first 5 years of 
marriage.  But, the effect is positive for those in years 6-10 of marriage.  In particular, the 1.07 
hazard ratio (p < 0.01) has the following interpretation: if we were to compare two identical 
couples in this group, where the only difference in their observed characteristics is one-
percentage-point difference in the unemployment rate during the prior year of marriage, then the 
couple facing the higher unemployment rate is estimated to be 1.07 times more likely to divorce 
in the year than the other couple.  This indicates a countercyclical divorce hazard for this group.  
For couples in the 11th or greater year of marriage, the effect of the state unemployment rate is 
statistically insignificant.   
Table 3 presents the estimated hazard ratios and standard errors of just the unemployment 
rate variables for all models, including a repeat of Models 1 and 2.  In Model 3, using the 
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national unemployment rate, a higher unemployment rate is estimated to increase the odds of 
divorce for all couples.  A one-percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate increases the 
hazard of divorce by 1.07 times (p < 0.05).  Again, when broken down by the stage of marriage 
in Model 4, the effect is positive and significant for couples in years 6 to 10 of marriage (hazard 
ratio=1.22, p < 0.01), but insignificant for couples in their first 5 years of marriage or married 
longer than 10 years.   
To give perspective on the different estimated effects from state and national 
unemployment rate, those in years 6 to 10 of marriage have an annual 2.9% divorce rate, on 
average.  If the odds increased by 1.07 times then they would have a 3.1% divorce probability 
each year.  If the odds were increased by 1.22 times, then the annual probability of divorce 
would increase to 3.5%.  
Models 5 to 8 add the two-year-lagged unemployment rates (for the state of residence as 
of t-3).  In Model 5, we include the state one-year and two-year-lagged state unemployment 
rates.  Neither is statistically significant.  However, when interacting the unemployment rate with 
the three stages of marriage, we get the same qualitative result for the one-year-lagged 
unemployment rate—that a higher unemployment rate leads to a greater probability of divorce 
for those in years 6 to 10 of marriage, but no effect on couples in the other stages of marriages.  
The increased probability of divorce of 12.3% for those in years 6 to 10 of marriage is nearly 
double the equivalent estimate in Model 2, but the difference may be due to being highly 
correlated with the two-year-lagged unemployment rate for the same group, which has a negative 
(albeit insignificant) odds ratio.  None of the hazard ratios for the two-year-lagged 
unemployment rates are significant. 
Using the national unemployment rates, neither odds ratio on the lagged unemployment 
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rates are significant in Model 7.  But again, Model 8 produces a similar result as in Model 6, with 
the effect being significant for the one-year-lagged unemployment rate for those in years 6 to 10 
of marriage and not for the other groups.  
In a sensitivity analysis, we estimate the same set of models without variables 
representing having children below age 6 and having children age 6 or older.  Including them 
seems standard, as the number of kids could affect whether a couple stays together or not.  
However, due to the endogeneity mentioned earlier, controlling for the number of children could 
cause econometric problems.  Specifically, having children is indicative of how stable the 
marriage is, so controlling for children could explain much of the variation in the hazard of 
divorce, leaving less variation that could be explained by the other variables, such as the 
unemployment rate.  The results from the models turned out to be very similar.  Because the 




One of the motivating factors for this analysis is the current economic crisis.  If we 
wanted to know how the crisis was affecting divorce rates, we cannot just look at whether 
divorces have changed, as cohort effects, current-period effects, and demographic shifts may also 
be affecting divorce rates.  An examination of relatively recent historical data, however, should 
provide a good indication of how this economic crisis is affecting marriage stability.  
We find, using national-level, but not state-level, unemployment rates, that overall 
divorces are more likely when the unemployment rate is higher (i.e., the economy is weaker).  
This result is consistent with the time-series findings from South (1985) of countercyclical 
23 
 
divorces, based on data from the post-WWII period through the late 1970s.   However, it stands 
in contrast to the cross-sectional and panel findings of procyclical divorces by Ruggles (1999) 
and Ono (1999).   
We take the analysis to the next step by examining how the strength of the economy 
affects the likelihood of divorce at different stages of marriage.  The estimates, using both state-
level and national-level unemployment rates, indicate that couples in years 6 to 10 of marriage 
have countercyclical divorce probabilities.  There is no evidence for any such pattern for couples 
who are in their first 5 years of marriage or who have been married more than 10 years.   
The primary mechanism contributing to countercyclical divorce rates is likely weak 
economies causing financial strain; and the primary mechanisms contributing to procyclical 
divorce rates are strong economies causing marriages to have less benefits from specialization 
(with both spouses more likely to be working and not as devoted to household production) and 
divorces being more affordable.   
For couples in years 6 to 10 of marriage, it appears that the financial strain from weak 
economic periods has a greater toll on the marriage, as the countercyclical forces dominate the 
procyclical forces.  For couples in their first 5 years of marriage, perhaps some of these effects 
cancel each other out or are very small.  We speculate that young couples would be less likely to 
have children and less likely to have mortgage payments, so they may be able to better withstand 
unemployment experiences.  For couples married more than 10 years, there are two potential 
explanations for their ability to withstand the economic crisis.  First, it is possible that marriages 
that last that as long as 10 years are stable enough that they would not be affected by financial 
problems.  Second, these older couples would have more expensive housing needs (from having 
children and higher standards as they get older), so that the weak economy affects the 
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affordability of divorces more for couples in this category, perhaps counteracting the effects of 
the financial strain when the economy is weak. 
The main point from this research, however, is that the current economic crisis is 
probably not affecting the stability of marriage for newly-married or long-lasting couples, but the 




Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables (n=89,340) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
   
Unemployment rate   
1-year-lagged unemployment rate (state level) 6.122 1.983 
1-year-lagged unemployment rate (national level) 6.106 1.333 
2-year-lagged unemployment rate (state level) 6.237 2.054 
2-year-lagged unemployment rate (national level) 6.185 1.373 
   
Couple characteristics   
  Have children under 6 years old 0.443 0.497 
  Have children 6 or older 0.440 0.496 
  Husband has a bachelor’s degree 0.246 0.431 
  Wife has a bachelor’s degree 0.247 0.431 
  Husband has a high school diploma  0.904 0.294 
  Wife has a high school diploma 0.932 0.253 
  Age of husband at time of marriage 25.43 5.23 
  Age of wife at time of marriage 23.49 4.78 
  Year of marriage 1984.62 4.73 
   
NLSY respondent characteristics   
  Black 0.102 0.303 
  Hispanic 0.063 0.243 
  AFQT percentile score divided by 10 5.157 2.794 
  Male 0.480 0.500 
  Catholic 0.350 0.477 
  Baptist 0.208 0.406 
  Other Christian 0.286 0.452 
  Jewish 0.016 0.125 
  Other religion 0.103 0.304 
  In 1979, attended religious services at least once per week 0.466 0.499 
  In 1979, attended religious services, but  
  less than once per week 0.358 0.479 




Table 2: Cox Proportional Hazard Model Results on Divorce: 1979-2006 
 (1) (2) 
 Overall By stage of marriage 
 B SE B eB B SE B eB 
Unemployment rate variables       
  1-year-lagged state unemployment  
    rate  
0.016 0.018 1.016    
  (1-year-lagged unemp. rate) x (being 
     in years 1-5 of marriage) 
   -0.006 0.022 0.994 
  (1-year-lagged unemp. rate) x  
     (being in years 6-10 of marriage) 
   0.068** 0.024 1.070 
  (1-year-lagged unemp. rate) x (being 
     in years 11 or more of marriage) 
   -0.017 0.038 0.984 
Couple characteristics       
  Have children under 6 years old -1.423** 0.060 0.241 -1.425** 0.060 0.241 
  Have children 6 or older -1.501** 0.078 0.223 -1.498** 0.078 0.224 
  Husband has a bachelor’s degree -0.235** 0.086 0.791 -0.236** 0.086 0.790 
  Wife has a bachelor’s degree -0.364** 0.091 0.695 -0.362** 0.091 0.696 
  Husband has a high school diploma  -0.061 0.090 0.941 -0.058 0.090 0.943 
  Wife has a high school diploma 0.072 0.093 1.075 0.072 0.093 1.075 
NLSY respondent characteristics       
  Black -0.019 0.071 0.981 -0.018 0.070 0.982 
  Hispanic -0.310** 0.077 0.733 -0.306** 0.077 0.736 
  AFQT percentile score/10 -0.079 0.075 0.924 -0.080 0.075 0.924 
  Male -0.018 0.011 0.983 -0.018 0.011 0.982 
  Catholic -0.003 0.128 0.997 -0.002 0.128 0.999 
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  Baptist 0.013 0.127 1.013 0.014 0.127 1.014 
  Other Christian -0.041 0.126 0.960 -0.040 0.126 0.961 
  Jewish -0.793* 0.402 0.453 -0.804* 0.403 0.447 
  Other religion 0.145 0.134 1.156 0.145 0.134 1.156 
  In 1979, attended religious at least  
    once per week 
0.068 0.066 1.070 0.068 0.066 1.070 
  In 1979, attended religious services, 
    but less than once per week 
-0.076 0.073 0.927 -0.075 0.073 0.928 
Note: eB indicates the estimated hazard ratio.  The models are weighted and also include state indicator variables, 
three-year-group-indicator variables for age-at-marriage, year-of-marriage, and year-of-analysis, and indicators for 
missing variables for the AFQT scores, education variables and age at marriage.  The excluded category for religion 
was “no relgion,” and the excluded category for religious-service attendance was “no attendance in the past year.”    
The sample sizes for both models are 89,340. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
  
Table 3. Summary of the effects of unemployment rates on the hazard of marriages ending in divorce for all models 
 Using models with 1-year lags Using models with 1-year and 2-year lags 
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(1-year-lagged unemp. rate) 
  x (being in years 11 or more of  









         





(2-year-lagged unemp. rate) 
  x (being in years 1-5 of marriage) 




(2-year-lagged unemp. rate) 
  x (being in years 6-10 of marriage) 




(2-year-lagged unemp. rate) 
  x (being in years 11 or more of  
  marriage) 




Number of observations 89,340 89,340 89,340 89,340 79,783 79,783 79,783 79,783 
Note: The figures represent hazard ratios and standard errors in parentheses.  The models also include all of the variables listed in Table 2 and the other variables 
indicated in the notes for Table 2.  The sample size is lower for Models 5-8 because observations are dropped for the second year of marriage (since the two-
year-lagged unemployment rate would be from before the marriage and the state at time t-3 was not observed. 
*p < .05. **p < .01




















FIGURE A-1. Example of the timing of measuring a divorce and the unemployment rate 
 
 
In this example, the couple got married in October 1992.  We set up here the observation 
on whether they divorce in the 4th year of marriage (between 10/95 and 10/96).  We use the one-
year-lagged unemployment rate measured as the average unemployment rate in the 3rd year of 
marriage (10/94 to 9/95).   And, we use the state of residence as of 10/94 (t-2) to determine the 
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